Abstract This article studies how individual behavior is affected by moral reflection in a dictator game with production. We make individuals reflect on fairness, in a structured way, before they play the dictator game. Our results suggest that moral reflection not only increases the weight people attach to fairness in distributive choices, but also has a strong effect on what people consider fair. Furthermore, we study the informational value of self-reported data. We find that self-reported data have substantial informational value, but do not add explanatory power to a random utility model estimated on purely behavioral data. Finally, we study whether there is a self-serving bias in the participants' fairness perceptions, but do not find much evidence of this phenomenon in the data.
Introduction
The dictator game has been an important device for studying social preferences, and it is well documented that, on average, people give away a substantial amount of money when they act as dictators in distributive situations (Camerer 2003) . However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the extent to which people care about fairness when making distributive choices; some give away half of the money, whereas others do not give away anything. Furthermore, by studying dictator games where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase, or where the price of giving varies, it has been shown that there is substantial heterogeneity in what people consider as fair in distributive situations (Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 2007; Fisman et al. 2007) .
Traditionally, the fairness issue is not stated explicitly in these experiments. This is contrary to many real-life situations, where distributive issues are presented and discussed as questions of fairness. Does this difference matter? 1 Would people's choices in a dictator game be affected by introducing the issue of fairness explicitly, and moreover by making individuals reflect on what is fair in such situations? Moral reflection could potentially have two different effects. First, it might affect how fair-minded people are in their behavior, i.e., how much weight they attach to fairness considerations relative to their self-interest. Second, it might affect what they consider to be the fair distribution.
We study the effect of moral reflection in a dictator game with production. We consider two treatments that are identical, except that in one treatment we made the participants reflect on what they consider a fair distribution. More specifically, we presented the participants with distributive situations of the same kind that they would face later in the experiment, and we asked them a hypothetical question regarding what they considered to be a fair distribution in such situations. A comparison of the two treatments allows us to shed some light on whether moral reflection may cause people to become more fair-minded when they make distributive decisions, and also, importantly, whether moral reflection may change people's perceptions of what is fair.
Our design also allows us to address the question of how we can best obtain information on people's social preferences. There are two important strands of literature on this issue. The experimental literature has typically studied this question by focusing on behavioral data, with real stakes involved for the participants (see, for example, Konow 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; Cherry et al. 2002; Frohlich et al. 2004; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fisman et al. 2007; Bellemare et al. 2008) . A parallel literature has generated data by asking hypothetical questions about what people find to be fair (see, for example, Schokkaert and Lagrou 1983; Amiel and Cowell 1992; Gaertner 1994; Schokkaert and Lagrou 1983; Gaertner and Schwettmann 2007) . Both approaches have obvious attractions. The real stakes in experiments ensure that the participants take the issue seriously, at least when the stakes involved are significant, whereas surveys often allow questions that map more cleanly into the normative literature. In our design, we capture both these elements. The experimental part involves high stakes, whereas the questionnaire part asks directly about people's fairness views.
We compare the two approaches both at the aggregate level and at the individual level. 2 At the aggregate level, we estimate a random utility model on the behavioral data and compare the estimated prevalence of the different fairness ideals with the self-reported data. We also consider the extent to which the fit of the random utility model can be improved by incorporating self-reported data. At the individual level, we compare two ways of classifying individuals according to their fairness ideal, by using self-reported data and behavioral data, respectively. This also allows us to test whether people act on a fairness ideal different from the one they self-reported, and whether such deviations are explained by a self-serving bias in fairness perceptions.
Our main findings are as follows: first, we find that moral reflection, as structured in the experiment, not only make people more fair-minded, but also has a strong effect on what people consider to be fair. In particular, we find a large drop in the share of individuals holding a strict egalitarian fairness ideal. Second, we find that the participants to a great extent truthfully self-report their fairness ideal, but that the fit of our model does not improve when we incorporate self-reported data. Third, we do not find much support for the hypothesis that people are self-serving in their fairness perceptions.
Section 2 provides a discussion of the experimental design, and Section 3 analyzes the effect of moral reflection on people's distributive choices. Section 4 compares the informational value of self-reported data and behavioral data. Section 5 addresses the extent of self-serving bias in fairness perceptions. Section 6 contains some concluding comments.
Design
The experiment is a version of a one-shot dictator game in which the distribution phase was preceded by a production phase where the participants were asked to invest an endowment and some faced a high rate of return and others a low rate of return. In order to study the role of moral reflection and the informational value of self-reported data, we conducted two treatments: a base treatment (B) and an elicitation treatment (E). In the E-treatment, the participants were asked a question about fairness before they entered the production phase, but after being informed of how the game would proceed. More specifically, they were given a description of a hypothetical setting that was identical to the actual setting that they would face later in the experiment. They were presented with three fairness ideals: to share equally, to share in proportion to individual investment, and to share in proportion to individual production. In the following, we refer to these fairness ideals as strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, respectively, but the participants were never confronted with these technical terms. In order to illustrate the fairness ideals, the participants were shown how each of them worked in three different distributive situations, and then they were asked to state which ideal they considered to be most fair. They were told explicitly that their answer would not in any way constrain their choices later in the experiment. The base treatment in our study contained only the production phase and the distribution phase, where the presentation was neutral and the fairness issue was never mentioned. We have reported the results from this treatment independently in Cappelen et al. (2007) .
The fact that the participants were informed about how the experiment would proceed could potentially influence the answers to the fairness questions in the E-treatment (Frohlich et al. 1987; Babcock et al. 1995) . However, at this stage of the experiment, the participants did not know their rate of return. In the absence of this information, all three fairness ideals are equally demanding: on average a person who strictly follows any of the ideals would give fifty percent to the other participant. Thus, selfish participants had no reason to report a particular fairness ideal to make it easier to act in accordance with the self-reported ideal later in the experiment.
In the production phase, each participant was given credits equal to 300 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately 50 US dollars. The participants kept the money not invested. Thus, they faced a genuine investment choice. Each participant was also randomly assigned a low or a high rate of return. Participants with a low rate of return would double the value of any investment they made, whereas those who were assigned a high rate of return would quadruple their investment. The participants were asked to determine how much they wanted to invest in two different one-shot games. Their choice alternatives were limited to 0 NOK, 100 NOK and 200 NOK, and the total amount invested in the two games could not exceed the initial credit they received. Production thus depended on factors both within and beyond individual control; the investment was clearly within individual control, and the rate of return on the investment was clearly beyond individual control.
In the distribution phase, each participant made choices in two distributive situations. In each case, they were given information about the other participant's rate of return, investment and production before they were asked to propose a distribution of the total income between themselves and the other participant. In order to ensure that the participants considered the two situations as independent decision problems, they were not informed about the outcome of the first game before the second game was completed. For each participant, one of the two proposals (the participant's own or that of the opponent) in one of the two games was randomly selected to determine the actual outcome. An individual's total earnings from the experiment were given by the actual outcome plus the amount of money not invested.
At the end of the experiment, the participants were assigned codes and instructed to mail their codes and bank account numbers to the accounting division of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Independently, the research team mailed a list including the codes and the total payment to the accounting division, which then disbursed the earnings directly to each participant's bank account. This procedure ensured that neither the participants nor the research team were in a position to identify how much each participant earned in the experiment. 3 The sequence of the two treatments is summarized in Table 1 , which highlights that the only difference between the treatments is the elicitation of fairness ideal before the individual rate of return is assigned.
All participants recruited were first-year students at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and no participant was allowed to participate more than once. In the invitation, they were told that they would initially receive 300 NOK (approximately 50 USD) to use in an experiment that would last about 40 min and that their total earnings from the experiment would depend on their choices. They were not informed about the purpose of the experiment. The average hourly opportunity cost for these students would be about 100 NOK, whereas the average payment from the experiment was 476 NOK. We had 96 students in the B-treatment and 92 students in the E-treatment. All communication was anonymous and conducted through a web-based interface.
Is moral reflection important?
We focus on how moral reflection affects behavior in the distribution phase of the experiment. In principle, moral reflection could also affect behavior in the production phase, but given the strong incentives to invest the full endowment, we did not expect any effect on investment choices. It also turned out that the investment pattern was almost the same in the two treatments: 83 out of 96 participants in the B-treatment and 89 out of 92 participants in the E-treatment invested their full endowment of 300 NOK. Of the 13 participants not investing the full endowment in the B-treatment, 12 participants invested 200 NOK. 4 We do, however, observe clear differences between the two treatments in the distribution phase. In studying these differences, we distinguish between the effect on the weight attached to fairness and the effect on the perception of fairness.
3.1 The effect on the weight attached to fairness Figure 1 shows complete histograms of the amount and share given in the two treatments. We note that the share of proposals demanding everything decreases from 31% in the B-treatment to 26% in the E-treatment, while the share of proposals giving away at least 50% increases from 33% in the B-treatment to 51% in the E-treatment. The increase in share giving away at least 50% is statistically significant ( p < 0.01), while the decrease in share demanding everything is not ( p = 0.28).
The average share given to the other participant increases from 27.1% in the B-treatment to 34.6% in the E-treatment, while the median share given away increases from 29.2% in the B-treatment to 50% in the E-treatment. Both these differences are statistically significant (with p < 0.01).
These results suggest that introducing moral reflection explicitly in the experiment, not surprisingly, makes people more fair-minded. However, the effect is moderate, which probably reflects that the fairness issue is salient to most people even in the neutral version of the dictator game.
The effect on perception of fairness
In order to study whether moral reflection changes people's perception of fairness, we estimate a random utility model in which people make a trade-off between income and fairness. 5 Let a participant i's production be given by x i = a i q i , where q i is the investment and a i is the rate of return on investment for participant i. The total production to be distributed between the two participants is then X (a, q) = x 1 +x 2 , where a = (a 1 , a 2 ) and q = (q 1 , q 2 ). Each participant proposes an amount of income y for himself and X − y for his opponent. Since almost all participants chose numbers that were multiples of 50, we restrict the choice of y to the set Y(a, q) = {0, 50, 100, . . . , X (a, q)}. 6 Consider now the following simple random utility model:
We assume that ε iy is i.i.d. extreme value distributed. The parameters γ > 0 and β i ≥0 determine the weight individual i attaches to income and fairness, respectively, and m k(i) (a, q) specifies the amount that individual i considers to be his fair income according to his fairness ideal k(i). We assume that the marginal utility loss of deviating from the fairness ideal is increasing in the size of the deviation, and we capture this by the quadratic term. There are three prominent fairness ideals in this situation, all presented for the participants in the E-treatment: strict egalitarianism (m SE (a, q) = X (a, q)/2), liberal egalitarianism (m LE (a, q) = q 1 X (a, q)/(q 1 +q 2 )), and libertarianism (m L (a, q) = a 1 q 1 ).
Each person is characterized by k(i) ∈ {SE, LE, L} and β i . In this section, we estimate only the distribution of (k(i), β i ) in the sample population, and we approximate the distribution of β by a log-normal distribution, such that log β ∼ N (ζ, σ 2 ). 7 Table 2 reports the estimates from this model for both treatments, and we also include estimates on the pooled data. A likelihood ratio test of equality between the treatments (with χ 2 5 = 22.0) has p < 0.01. Comparing the estimates from the two treatments, we find that there is a substantial difference in the prevalence of fairness ideals. In particular, the share of strict egalitarians is much lower in the E-treatment, and the share of libertarians is much higher in the B-treatment.
The fact that the participants in the E-treatment were presented with the three fairness ideals might have made these three alternatives more salient. There is, however, no reason to expect that listing these three alternatives should affect the relative 7 There are a number of other interesting models of social preferences in the literature: see among others Fehr and Schmidt (1999) ; Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ; Charness and Rabin (2002) ; Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for tests of these models. Many of the differences between these models and our model are not relevant given the design of our experiment. Our analysis is robust to alternative specifications of the loss function, including measuring deviations from the fairness ideal in absolute terms or in relative terms. For further discussion of this model, see Cappelen et al. (2007) and the appendix published on the AER website that includes extensive robustness checks with respect to model variations, http://www.e-aer.org/ data/june07/20050838_app.pdf and, in another economic context, Cappelen et al. (2010) . Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the BHHH method (Berndt et al. 1974) . Money is scaled in units of 1000 NOK. One population share and its standard error is calculated residually. The likelihood is maximized using the FmOpt library (Ferrall 2005) prevalence of any of them. We therefore interpret these results as suggesting that an important effect of introducing moral reflection, as structured in this experiment, is that it changes some of the participants' perception of fairness.
The informational value of self-reported data
Do people act in accordance with their reported fairness ideal in the distribution phase? At the aggregate level, we can study this question by comparing, for the E-treatment, the estimated population shares with the self-reported population shares. In Table 3 , we observe that the self-reported population shares are, in our view, quite close to the estimated population shares. In both cases, the share of strict egalitarians is clearly smaller than the shares of the two other fairness ideals, and the shares of liberal egalitarians and libertarians are of the same magnitude. The self-reported data report a smaller share of strict egalitarians and a larger share of libertarians, but the differences are smaller than twice the standard errors of the estimated model. Hence, overall, we find the population estimates and the self-reported data to be strikingly similar. Our participants were not given any economic incentives when responding to the hypothetical question, and they knew that they would not be constrained in any way later in the experiment by what they self-reported. In such an environment, one might fear that the participants would not think carefully about the question and would respond more or less at random. On the contrary, our analysis suggests that, to a great extent, people self-reported the fairness ideal that they acted upon in the distribution phase. One possible interpretation of this finding is that people respond to questionnaires in a truthful manner, but it could also reflect a desire to behave in line with the self-reported fairness ideal.
Can self-reported data explain behavior?
To what extent can self-reported data improve our understanding of individual behavior? To address this question, we apply the self-reported data to classify individuals by fairness ideal. We then compare the informational value of this classification to Bayesian classifications that rely on behavioral data. We do this by introducing the various classifications in the estimation of the random utility model (1), and then compare the fit of the different specifications for the E-treatment.
The classification of individuals according to self-reported data is straightforward. A person self-reporting strict egalitarianism is classified as strict egalitarian, and similarly for a person self-reporting liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism. The Bayesian classifications rely on behavioral data. We apply the estimates of the random utility model to calculate a posteriori probabilities for an individual having each of the fairness ideals, and then we apply the a posteriori probabilities to classify individuals. 8 The a posteriori probability of an individual i having fairness ideal k is given by
where Y i and Z i represent the choices and the economic environment of individual i. We assume that the proportion of individuals of each fairness ideal is independent of the environment, such that P(k|Z i ) = P(k) for all Z i . In order to calculate the a posteriori probabilities P(k|Y i , Z i ), we can then use the estimated population shares reported in Table 2 for P(k), and calculate P(Y i |Z i ) and P(Y i |k, Z i ) by the unconditional and conditional likelihoods of observing this behavior given the estimates. Given the a posteriori probabilities, there are different ways of classifying individuals. The most straightforward approach is the simple Bayes classification rule, whereby each individual is classified as having the fairness ideal k that maximizes P(k|Y i , Z i ). 9 If we let z ik be a dummy indicator for whether individual i is classified as having fairness ideal k, we can formally write the classification program as follows:
and z ik ∈ {0, 1} for all i and k.
The problem with this classification procedure in our context is that some individuals in their distributive choices reveal very little information about their fairness ideal. The simple Bayes classification rule assigns all these individuals the fairness ideal that is most prevalent in the population (liberal egalitarianism). However, we have no reason to suspect that it is only liberal egalitarians who behave in a way that is not informative about their fairness ideal, and therefore the simple Bayes classification rule tends to classify too many individuals as liberal egalitarians.
An alternative approach is to require the share of people classified as being of each fairness type to be the same as our estimated population shares. Formally, this means that we add the restriction that
where λ k is the estimated population share of type k, n is the sample size and round 1 is a round-to-integer operator. Adding (3d) to the program adds considerable computational complexity. 10 An exhaustive search would take excessively long time, but it is well known that a good solution often can be found in a relatively short time. 11 Our algorithm stabilized at a classification that gave a value of the objective (3a) of −43.03, a value that can be compared to the value of −33.04 from the simple Bayesian classification without imposing (3d) and to the value of −78.08 that we obtain by using the self-reported classification. 12 In order to compare the classifications, self-reported and Bayesian, we estimate the random utility model under the assumption that an individual's fairness ideal is correctly characterized by the respective classification. We then compare the fit of the model for these specifications. Note that it is not obvious which classification should perform better. A problem for the self-reported classification is that people might not have reported their fairness ideal truthfully, while a problem for the Bayesian classifications is that some individuals may not have revealed much about their fairness ideal in their choices. Table 4 reports the estimates of the random utility model based on the three classifications. We only estimate the distribution of the weight attached to fairness and the marginal utility of money, since the fairness ideal of each individual is given by the 11 We ran our algorithm for 24 h on an Intel Xeon processor operating at 3.4 GHz. 12 We solve (3) using the lp_solve library (Berkelaar et al. 2007 ). Notes: The numbers are calculated using the restriction that k(i) is equal to the self-reported ideal or the Bayesian classifications proposed in (3). Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the BHHH method (Berndt et al. 1974) and are not corrected for the first-step estimation to do the classification. Money is scaled in units of 1000 NOK respective classification. We observe that the Bayesian classifications clearly outperform the model that relies on self-reported fairness ideals. 13 First, there is a substantial difference in the log likelihood values. 14 Second, in the Bayesian specifications, we estimate a much higher γ , which translates into less room for idiosyncratic randomness in behavior. This suggests that even though self-reported data contains substantial informational value, there is even more to learn from studying behavioral data. We also note that the estimates for the two Bayesian specifications are very close, which reflect that the two classification methods mainly differ in terms of how they treat people who behave in a way which, given our model, is equally likely for all three fairness ideals. These estimates are also very close to the estimates reported in the previous section for the E-treatment, which may serve as a consistency check of our specification.
Who misreports?
In order to study the match between self-reported fairness ideals and actual behavior at the individual level, we present Fig. 2 , in which we plot the distribution of a posteriori probabilities for each individual who has self-reported this fairness type. If an individual has chosen in such a manner that we can perfectly identify his fairness ideal, he is located at the corner representing this fairness ideal. On the other hand, if the person has not revealed a preferences for any of the three fairness ideals through his choices, he is located at the point that represents the estimated population shares in this ternary diagram.
As we can see from Fig. 2 , for all three fairness ideals, there are individuals who are identified perfectly as having the fairness ideal they have self-reported. This is the case for 5 out of 9 strict egalitarians, 13 out of 43 liberal egalitarians and 14 out of 40 Notes: Decreased A posteriori probability of the self-reported ideal is less than the population estimate minus one percentage point. No change A posteriori probability of the self-reported ideal is within one percentage point of the population estimate. Increased A posteriori probability of the self-reported ideal is more than one percentage point larger than the population estimate libertarians. For the rest, we cannot rule out that they have acted on a different ideal than the one they self-reported. We consider a person to have misreported his fairness ideal if, through his distributive choices, he has decreased the likelihood of having his self-reported fairness ideal by at least one percentage point. In the diagram, such an individual would be located further away from his fairness ideal than the point of the estimated population shares. Table 5 summarizes this information for all three fairness ideals. We observe that 17.4% of the participants misreported, which constitute 20.8% of those who through their behavior either decreased or increased the probability of having one of the three fairness ideals. Interestingly, misreporting seems to be equally prevalent for the different self-reported fairness ideals.
Self-serving bias
A potential explanation for the misreporting may be that the participants have a selfserving bias in fairness perceptions when making distributive choices. A self-serving bias of this kind would be that their fairness considerations are influenced in some conscious or unconscious way by what is most beneficial for them in the situation. 15 We provide two tests of the extent to which there is a self-serving bias in fairness perceptions. First, we consider whether misreporting is more prevalent among those who could justify taking more by reference to a fairness ideal different from the one selfreported. Second, we consider whether the randomly assigned rate of return affected the fairness perceptions among the participants in a self-serving manner.
Self-serving bias and misreporting
The self-reported fairness ideal is expressed before the participants have information that would allow them to judge which fairness ideal would justify most to themselves in the distribution phase. Hence, for some, there would be an incentive to let a different fairness ideal than the one self-reported influence their choices, and this might lead to a self-serving bias in fairness perceptions and misreporting.
In order to test for a self-serving bias in fairness perceptions, we therefore study whether there is more misreporting in the group that has something to gain from it than in the group that self-reported the fairness ideal that turned out to be most favorable to them. 16 It turns out that this is the case, 21.1% versus 12.5% of the participants misreport, but the difference is not statistically significant ( p = 0.28).
5.2 Self-serving bias and the rate of return An alternative test of self-serving bias in fairness perceptions, applying to both treatments, is to study whether fairness perceptions are affected by the randomly assigned rate of return. More specifically, is it the case that individuals assigned a high rate of return tend to act on the libertarian fairness ideal (which would provide a fairness justification for keeping the benefits from a high rate of return), and that individuals assigned a low rate of return tend to be motivated by a strict egalitarian fairness ideal? 15 In line with Dana et al. (2007) , we study this question by looking at individual behavior. An alternative approach, also common in the literature, is to study how fairness judgments are shaped by knowledge of what would be most favorable for oneself (Messick and Sentis 1983) . 16 A self-reported ideal is classified as not the most favorable if one of the two other fairness ideals would justify more to this person (in total over the two situations). Notes: The a posteriori probabilities are based on the estimates in Table 2 Table 6 compares the a posteriori probabilities for the high rate of return group and the low rate of return group. For both treatments, the average probability of being a libertarian is higher for the high return group than for the low return group. Similarly, there is a movement in the opposite direction for the probability of being a strict egalitarian. Considering the sample sizes, however, these changes are not particularly large. Hence, neither of our tests provide strong evidence of self-serving bias, which confirms simpler tests performed in Cappelen et al. (2007) .
We also note that the difference between the high rate of return and the low rate of return group is smaller in the E-treatment than in the B-treatment. Although the evidence is weak, this may indicate that the introduction of moral reflection makes people even less susceptible to self-serving bias. 17
Concluding remarks
Our findings suggest that moral reflection, as structured in this experiment, has a significant impact on individual behavior. It not only makes people more fair-minded in distributive choices, but it also changes people's perception of what is a fair distribution. While we find that strict egalitarianism is the most prevalent fairness ideal in the base treatment, it is the least prevalent fairness ideal in the elicitation treatment where the participants had to reflect in advance on their view of a fair distribution. One interpretation of this finding is that the strict egalitarian fairness ideal corresponds to a widely adopted heuristic decision rule that is acceptable in many social situations, but reflecting on the fairness issue makes some people consider such a rule unjustifiable in the context of this experiment. Moral reflection thus allows the participants to move from simple heuristic rules to rules that are sensitive to the details of the situation. However, there are other possible interpretations, and thus further research is needed in order to clarify what exactly makes moral reflection, in our experiment initiated by answering questions about fairness, change individual behavior.
Studies of social preferences have employed both questionnaires and experiments. Our design allows us to compare the relative informational value of the data from these two approaches. We find that a majority of the participants do not misreport when asked a hypothetical question about fairness, and hence, self-reported data have substantial informational value. However, we also show that a specification 17 Haisley and Weber (2010) reach a similar conclusion, although in a different setting. based purely on behavioral data performs better than a specification that incorporates self-reported data.
Finally, we find no strong evidence of self-serving bias among the participants. In particular, it does not seem to be the main explanation for misreporting. An alternative explanation might simply be that some people do not put much thought into their answers when there is no monetary incentive. This provides support for the experimental approach of introducing real stakes in the study of social preferences.
